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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to §78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and
Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. WAS A SUMMONS ISSUED WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THE
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT IN EVELYN MUIR'S FIRST CASE, OR WAS
IT OTHERWISE ERROR TO DISMISS EVELYN MUIR'S FIRST CASE? THE
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW IS DE NOVO REVIEW WITH THE
RECORD VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO EVELYN MUIR.
DISCUSSION; Without holding an evidentiary hearing
or any other hearing, the Court ruled that the activities of
Hansen and Anderson on October 19, 1988, did not constitute
issuance of a Summons, and dismissed the first case without
prejudice. Dismissal on this record warrants de novo review
with no deference given to the trial court.
Citations;
State. Department of Social Services vs. Viiil. 784
P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989);
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt vs. Blomquist. 773 P.2d
1382 (Utah 1989)
2. WAS EVELYN MUIR'S FIRST CASE COMMENCED BY THE
FILING OF A COMPLAINT AND WAS EVELYN MUIR'S SECOND CASE
BROUGHT WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE FIRST CASE
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, OR WAS IT OTHERWISE ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT
COURT TO DISMISS THE SECOND CASE? THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE
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REVIEW IS DE NOVO REVIEW WITH THE RECORD VIEWED IN THE LIGHT
MOST FAVORABLE TO EVELYN MUIR.
DISCUSSION; The Court also dismissed the second case
without holding an evidentiary hearing or any other hearing.
The Court retrospectively ruled that the first case had never
been commenced, and therefore Evelyn Muir could not rely upon
the Utah Saving Statute at U.C.A. §78-12-40. Such a
dismissal with prejudice also warrants a de novo review with
the record viewed in the light most favorable to Evelyn Muir
based on the authorities cited under Issue No. One above.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following constitutional provisions, statutes,
and rules are set forth as addenda to this brief, as
permitted by Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6) and
24(f)(2):
Addendum I
- Constitution of Utah, Article I, §7
Addendum II - Constitution of Utah, Article I, §11
Addendum III - U.C.A., §78-12-40
Addendum IV - U.C.A., §78-27-25
Addendum V
- U.R.C.P. 1(a)
- U.R.C.P. 3(a)
- U.R.C.P. 3(c)
- U.R.C.P. 4(a)
- U.R.C.P. 4(b)
- U.R.C.P. 4(d)
Addendum VI - U.R.C.P. 1(a) (post April 1, 1990)
- U.R.C.P. 3(a) (post April 1, 1990)
- U.R.C.P. 3(b) (post April 1, 1990)
- U.R.C.P. 4(a) (post April 1, 1990)
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- U.R.C.P., 4(b) (post April 1, 1990)
- U.R.C.P., 4(d) (post April 1, 1990)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a consolidated appeal of two (2) wrongful
death actions filed by Evelyn Muir. The first case was
dismissed without prejudice when the Court ruled that Summons
had not issued within three (3) months of the filing of the
Complaint. The second case was brought under the Utah Saving
Statute at U.C.A., §78-12-40. The second case was dismissed
with prejudice after the Court retrospectively ruled that the
first case had never been commenced. Evelyn Muir appealed
both dismissals and both Defendants cross-appealed the
dismissal of the first case.
FACTS
Evelyn Muir was widowed when her husband was killed
in a mine explosion on September 5, 1986. She filed her
first wrongful death action on September 1, 1988, by and
through the Salt Lake City law firm then known as Hansen and
Anderson. On October 19, 1988, Hansen and Anderson signed
Summonses and caused Summonses with Complaints to be placed
in the hands of a person qualified to serve process upon the
Defendants. (Record I, pp. 1-21)
As set forth in Addendum VII to this Brief, a Hansen
and Anderson shareholder stated the following about the
firm's activities:
My entire purpose in preparing the summonses
and delivering them to Mr. Jackson in this
matter was to comply with Rule 4(a) of the
3

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. But for Rule
4(a), I would not have prepared and delivered
the summonses to Mr. Jackson. I have utilized
Mr. Jackson on several occasions to serve
process on behalf of clients of the firm.
(Affidavit of William P. Schwartz, Record I,
p. 157, Addendum VII).

Evelyn Muir was in the process of selecting a new
attorney, so Hansen and Anderson told the process server to
wait before serving process so that successor counsel could
coordinate service. It took longer than expected to select
successor counsel, and in July, 1989, successor counsel
contacted the process server and arranged for service of
process, which was accomplished that month. (Record I, pp.
16-21, 33-37).
The Defendants moved for dismissal of the action on
the grounds that summons had not been issued within the three
(3) month period set forth in Rule 4(b) of the U.R.C.P. In
addition to moving for dismissal based on that rule,
Defendants also moved the Court to dismiss the* case with
prejudice on the grounds that the case had never commenced
due to failure to issue a summons within three* (3) months and
Defendants also engaged in discovery going to the merits of
the case by using formal discovery procedures to obtain an
autopsy report from the Utah State Medical Exciminer. (Record
I, pp. 20-30, 44-56, 91-93).
Mrs. Muir opposed the motions with memoranda,
affidavits, and deposition testimony, on the grounds that
summons had been issued on October 19, 1988, that the
Defendants had appeared and consented to the jurisdiction of
the court through their conduct by seeking a dismissal with
4

prejudice and by engaging in discovery going into the merits
of the case, and, in any event, the action could be refiled
under the saving statute at U.C.A. §78-12-40. (Record I, pp.
38-43, 66-70, 157-161).
The District Court ruled that the activities of
Hansen and Anderson on October 19, 1988, did not constitute
issuance of a Summons, and therefore no Summons had been
issued within the three (3) month period set forth in Rule
4(b) of the U.R.C.P. The Court dismissed the case without
prejudice. (Record I, pp 203-206, 225-258).
Mrs. Muir filed a second Complaint prior to the
expiration of the one (1) year period set forth in the Utah
Saving Statute at U.C.A. §78-12-40. The Court ruled in the
second case that Mrs. Muir could not rely on the Utah Savings
Statute, because even though the Complaint in the first case
had been filed with the Court prior to the running of the
applicable statute of limitations, and had been dismissed
without prejudice after the running of the statute of
limitations, Summonses had not been issued within three (3)
months in the prior case, and therefore the prior case had
never been commenced. (Record II, pp. 1-24, 132-135).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. Hansen and Anderson issued Summonses on October
19, 1988, within three (3) months of the filing of the first
Complaint on September 1, 1988.
2. The Defendants appeared and litigated the first
case on the merits by pursuing the records deposition of the
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Utah State Medical Examiner, by seeking dismissal with
prejudice, and by filing cross-appeals when the trial court
rejected their efforts to obtain a dismissal with prejudice.
Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction over th€* Defendants in
both cases regardless of whether a Summons was issued within
three (3) months of the filing of the Complaint in the first
case filed by Evelyn Muir.
3* In Utah, an action is commenced by the filing of
a Complaint, regardless of whether a Summons is issued within
three (3) months of the filing of the Complaint.
4. Evelyn Muir's second case was properly brought
under the Utah Saving Statute, U.C.A. §78-12-40, in that the
Complaint in the first case was filed prior to the running of
the statute of limitations and the case was dismissed without
prejudice after the running of the statute of limitations.
5. The dismissal without prejudice of the first
case, when combined with the dismissal with prejudice of the
second case based upon a retrospective ruling that the first
case was never commenced, has the cumulative effect of
denying Evelyn Muir due process of law, access to open
courts, and remedy by due course of law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO
DISMISS THE FIRST CASE FILED BY EVELYN MUIR.
Evelyn Muir placed her trust and confidence in the
Court and in Hansen & Anderson, who were officers of the
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Court responsible for preserving her rights and protecting
her interests in connection with the mine explosion that
widowed her on September 5, 1986.
Hansen & Anderson filed Evelyn Muir's first wrongful
death action on September 1, 1988, a few days prior to the
running of the statute of limitations. With actual notice
and knowledge that a Summons had to be issued within three
(3) months, Hansen & Anderson prepared and signed Summonses
on October 19, 1988, and placed them in the hands of a person
qualified to serve process for the purpose of process to be
served after Evelyn Muir selected successor counsel.
(Affidavit of William P. Schwartz, Record I, p. 157, Addendum
VII) .
More than three (3) months elapsed after the filing
of the Complaint before Evelyn Muir selected successor
counsel. Successor counsel contacted the process server who
had been given the signed Summonses and Complaints on October
19, 1988, and arranged for service of process prior to the
expiration of one (1) year from the filing of the Complaint.
The applicable rules of procedure were complied with in every
respect. Pursuant to U.R.C.P. 4(a), a Summons was placed in
the hands of a person qualified to serve of process, pursuant
to U.R.C.P. 4(b), this was done within three (3) months of
the filing of the Complaint, and pursuant to U.R.C.P., 4(a),
this was done for the purpose of service of process to be
accomplished after Plaintiff selected successor counsel. The
process server was qualified to serve process in this state
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 4(d) and was qualified to serve process
outside of this state under U.C.A. §78-27-25. Such service
of process was accomplished within one (1) year pursuant to
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the provisions of U.R.C.P, 4(b) and the holding in Valley
Asphalt. Inc. vs. Eldon J. Stubbs Construction, 714 P.2d
1142 (Utah 1986).
Nevertheless, the District Court dismissed the case
without prejudice upon concluding that the activities of
Hansen & Anderson on October 19, 1988, were not for the
"purpose" of service of process in that process was to be
served after Evelyn Muir secured successor counsel.
There is no language in U.R.C.P. 4(a) providing that
issuance of a Summons for purpose of service cit a future date
does not constitute issuance of a Summons. The District
Court unnecessarily narrowed U.R.C.P. 4(a). In so doing, the
District Court failed to follow U.R.C.P. 1(a), which provides
that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall be liberally
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.
This matter should be reversed and remanded for the
simple reason that Summonses were issued on October 19, 1988.
Assuming arguendo that the Summonses were not issued
on October 19, 1988, it was still error to dismiss Evelyn
Muir's first case, because the Court obtained personal
jurisdiction over both named Defendants when they appeared
and litigated on the merits. Defendants did not limit
themselves to a simple motion to quash service*. Instead,
they moved for dismissal of the action with prejudice and
conducted discovery going to the underlying factual merits of
the action by pursuing the records deposition of the Utah
State Medical Examiner in order to secure medical records of
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the autopsy of Evelyn Muir's late husband. Not satisfied
with a dismissal without prejudice, Defendants pursued a
dismissal with prejudice, and when the District Court
rejected those efforts, they filed cross-appeals to the Utah
Supreme Court.
Due to all of this conduct seeking dismissal with
prejudice and using the power of the Court to obtain
discovery going to the underlying factual merits of the case,
Defendants can no longer claim that the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over them on account of any defect in issuance
of Summons. A defective Summons is like a baseball pitched
outside of the strike zone on a full count. The batter can
take a ball and get a walk, which is like a motion to quash.
The batter is also free to swing the bat, which is like a
motion to dismiss with prejudice and other litigation
activity going to the merits of a lawsuit. If the batter
connects for extra bases, the choice to swing the bat will
have paid off. However, if the batter misses, he will not be
allowed to walk to first. Yet, in this case, the figurative
batter was treated in that way when a dismissal without
prejudice was allowed after Defendants had litigated on the
merits and sought dismissal with prejudice.
While it may no longer be necessary to exalt form
over substance by reciting the magic words "special
appearance" when quashing service of process, and while some
procedural motions concerning jurisdiction are not waived by
being combined with other motions, the narrow ability to
avoid personal jurisdiction through a quash of service is
lost when Defendants appear and litigate on the merits in an
attempt to secure dismissal with prejudice.
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In summary, the Summonses in this case were properly
issued within three (3) months of the filing of the
Complaint. Even if they were not, Defendants, who are still
before this Court on their own cross-appeal seeking dismissal
with prejudice are well beyond the point of using any defect
in issuance Summons as a basis for lack of personal
jurisdiction over them. The case should be remanded for
further proceedings on the merits.
POINT II. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO
DISMISS THE SECOND CASE FILED BY EVELYN MUIR.
Evelyn Muir filed a second lawsuit after Defendants
started claiming that her first lawsuit had already been
automatically deemed dismissed. The Defendants again raised
some purely procedural defenses. This time, the District
Court properly noted that Defendants could not secure a
dismissal based upon procedural points, because they had
appeared on the merits. The District Court wrote:
The Court will not get into the issue of the
sufficiency of the service on Apache since
this Defendant has appeared in this case by
way of a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and
the Amended Complaint, and those motions were
filed on Febrxiary 20, 1990.
In addition, the lack of proper service is not
usually grounds for dismissal but may result
in an order quashing the return of service,
but nothing more. (Record II, p. 132-133)
Evelyn Muir had
(1) year of December 1,
that the first case had
(3) months after it had

to file her second lawsuit within one
1988, because Defendants were arguing
been automatically dismissed three
been filed (Record I, p. 48)
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Accordingly, Evelyn Muir could not await the outcome
of her first case, but prudently filed her second case on
November 27, 1989, so that it was filed prior to December 1,
1989.
After the Court subsequently dismissed her first case
without prejudice, she amended the Complaint in the second
case once as a matter of course to indicate specifically that
it was brought under the provisions of the Utah Saving
Statute at U.C.A. §78-12-40 within one (1) year after a
failure otherwise than upon the merits in an action commenced
within due time. (Record II, p. 15)
Even though the District Court rejected the
Defendants1 procedural arguments concerning service of
process, it retrospectively ruled that the first case had
never been commenced, because Summons had not been issued
within three (3) months of the filing of the Complaint, and,
therefore, Evelyn Muir could not rely on the Utah Saving
Statute in the second case.
This was an error of law on the part of the District
Court. In Utah, an action is commenced by the filing of a
Complaint, regardless of whether a Summons is subsequently
issued within due time.
Under tne Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that were in
effect at the time, U.R.C.P. 3(a) provided that an action was
commenced by filing a Complaint with the Court, or by the
service of a Summons, and U.R.C.P. 3(c) provided that the
Court had jurisdiction from the time of the filing of the
Complaint or the service of the Summons.
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For purposes of determining whether a prior action
was commenced in due time when a subsequent action is filed
under a saving statute, in some states the filing of the
Complaint itself commences the action while in other states
an action is not deemed commenced within due time unless a
Summons is subsequently issued.
Utah is one of the states where the filing of the
Complaint alone is sufficient. Utah is so listed in an
annotation on the subject that appears at 27 ALR.2d 236, 255.
In the case of Askwith vs. Ellis,
1934) the Utah Supreme Court held that an
by the filing of a Complaint alone. This
was again recently re<iffirmed by the Utah
the case of Madsen vs. Borthick, 769 P.2d

38 P.2d 757 (Utah
action is commenced
principle of law
Supreme Court in
254 (Utah 1988).

In that case, the Defendants tried to expand the
requirements for commencing an action for purpose of a
subsequent action under the Utah Saving Statute by arguing
that a prior action held not been commenced in due time
because a pre-complaint statutory notice requirement
applicable to the case had not been complied with. The Utah
Supreme Court rejected this effort to expand the requirements
for commencing an action. Justice Zimmerman wrote:
In Utah, suits are commenced by the filing of
a complaint or the service of a summons . .
Accordingly, Evelyn Muir's first case was commenced
within due time when the Complaint was filed on September 1,
1988, it was dismissed without prejudice after the statute of
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limitations on her wrongful death claim had run, and she was
entitled to rely on the Utah Saving Statute.
Rules 3 and 4 of the U.R.C.P. were amended effective
April 1, 1990. The requirement that a Summons be issued
within three (3) months and served within one (1) year was
changed so that now the only requirement is that the Summons
be served no later than one hundred twenty (120) days after
the filing of the Complaint unless the Court allows a longer
period for good cause shown. The new rule specifically
states that a failure to timely serve will result in a
dismissal without prejudice. To the extent that the new Rule
4 has the same basic purpose as the old rule, failures to
issue or serve process under the old rule should also lead to
dismissal without prejudice. To the extent that the decision
in this case under the old rule has some precedential value
in construing the new rule, this Court should reverse and
remand this action so that the handling of this case is
consistent with the dismissal without prejudice standard in
the new rule.
Such a result would be fair, just, and reasonable.
Any failure to issue a Summons within three (3) months was
not an adjudication upon the merits, but merely a procedural
defect that did not relate to the merits in any way.
Hansen & Anderson signed a Summons and gave it to a
process server on October 19, 1988, for the express purpose
of complying with the issuance requirement under the old
rule. (Affidavit of William P. Schultz, Record I at p. 157,
Addendum VII). Yet, based upon the cumulative rulings of the
Court in the two (2) cases filed by Evelyn Muir, when Evelyn
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Muir and her old attorneys woke up on the morning of December
2, 1988, without their knowing it, their action was deemed
never commenced and forever barred.
The District Court did not cite any precedent that
Hansen & Anderson could or should have relied upon on October
19, 1988, to take any action other than the action taken.
Evelyn Muir, who placed her trust and confidence in the Court
for remedy after she was widowed in a mine explosion, is left
with no satisfactory explanation of how her old attorneys
could have made a conscious and affirmative effort to comply
with the rules on October 19, 1988, only to have the District
Court subsequently and retrospectively rule that her lawsuit
had never been commenced.
Under these circumstances, the cumulative effect of
the dismissals rises to the level of a denial of due process
of law under Article 1, Section 7, of the Constitution of
Utah, and a denial of Evelyn Muirfs rights to open courts and
remedy by due course of law administered without denial or
unnecessary delay under Article I, Section 11, of the
Constitution of Utah (See Addenda I and II).
CONCLUSION
The orders of dismissal should be reversed and the
matter should be remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings on all of Evelyn Muir's claims.

14

ber, 1990.

DATED this

COPI]
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for
Appellant, an^ Cross-JSfcpellee,
Evelyn Muir
muir.brf
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Section
21. [Slavery forbidden.]
22. [Private property for public use.]
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
25. [Rights retained by people.]
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
27. [Fundamental rights.]

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
PREAMBLE
Article
I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
H. STATE BOUNDARIES
m . ORDINANCE
IV. ELECTIONS AND RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE
V. DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
V n . EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
VIE. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
IX. CONGRESSIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE
APPORTIONMENT
X. EDUCATION
XI. COUNTIES, CITIES AND TOWNS
X n . CORPORATIONS
XHI. REVENUE AND TAXATION
XIV. PUBUC DEBT
XV. MILITIA
XVI. LABOR
XVH. WATER RIGHTS
XVIH. FORESTRY
XIX. PUBUC BUILDINGS AND STATE
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Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire,
possess and protect property; to worship according to
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right.

1898

Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all
free governments are founded on their authority for
their equal protection and benefit, and they have t h e
right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may require.
1898
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from t h e Union.]
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of t h e
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United
States is the supreme law of the land.
1898
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — N o property qualification t o vote o r hold office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed.
The State shall make no law respecting a n establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote a t
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or t h e
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church
and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or
interfere with its functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property
qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.

PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we,
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate
the principles of free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION.
1896
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS
Section
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to
vote or hold office.]
5. [Habeas corpus.]
6. [Right to bear arms.]
7. [Due process of law.]
8. [Offenses bailable.]
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
10. [Trial by jury.]
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
12. [Rights of accused persons.]
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.]
19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]

1898

Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety requires it.
1898
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear
arms for security and defense of self, family, others,
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use
of arms.
1985
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
1896
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except:
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Art I, § 9

CONSTITUTION OP UTAH

(a) persons charged with a capital offense
when there is substantial evidence to support the
charge, or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is
substantial evidence to support the new felony
charge, or
(c) persons charged with a crime, as defined by
statute, when there is substantial evidence to
support the charge and the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the person would
constitute a substantial danger to self or any
other person or to the community or is likely to
flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on
bail
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal only as prescribed by law
1989
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines
shall not be imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor
1896

Sec. 10. [Trial b y jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors In criminal cases t h e verdict shall
be unanimous In civil cases three-fourths of t h e jurors m a y find a verdict A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded
1896
Sec. 11. [Courts o p e n — R e d r e s s of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for a n
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay, and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party

1896

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and b> counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself, a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense
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the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or
without such examination and commitment The formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature
1949

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden —
Issuance of warrant.]
The n g h t of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
w a r r a n t shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or afifi rmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and t h e person or thing to be
seized
1896
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press —
Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain t h e
freedom of speech or of the press In all criminal prosecutions for libel t h e t r u t h m a y be given in evidence
to the jury, and if it shall appear to the jury t h a t t h e
m a t t e r charged as libelous is true, and was published
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, t h e party
shall be acquitted, and the jury shall have the right
to determine t h e law and t h e fact
1896
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in
cases of absconding debtors
1896
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the
free exercise of the nght of suffrage Soldiers, in time
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the
State» under regulations to be prescribed by law
1896

Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed
1896

Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in
levying war against it, or in adhenng to its enemies
or in giving them aid and comfort No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act
1896
Sec. 20. [Military s u b o r d i n a t e t o the civil
power.]
Th§ military shall be in strict subordination to t h e
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be
quartered in any house without t h e consent of t h e
owner, nor in time of w a r except in a manner to be
prescribed by law
1896
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime, whereof t h e party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist withm this
State

1896

1896

Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with

Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without j ust compensation
1896
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any
franchise, privilege or immunity
1896
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or other governmental entity, the same as to actions
by private parties, except under Section 78-12-33 5
1988

78-12-33.5. Statute of limitations — Asbestos
damages — Action by state or governmental entity.
(1) (a) No statute of limitations or repose may bar
an action by the state or other governmental entity to recover damages from any manufacturer
of any construction materials containing asbestos, when the action arises out of the manufac
turer's providing the materials, directly or
though other persons, to the state or other governmental entity or to a contractor on behalf of
the state or other governmental entity
(b) Subsection (a) provides for actions not yet
barred, and also acts retroactively to permit actions under this section that are otherwise
barred
(2) As used in this section, "asbestos" means
asbestiform vaneties of
(a) chrysotile (serpentine),
(b) crocidohte (nebeckite),
(c) amosite (cummingtonite-grunente),
(d) anthophylhte,
(e) tremoiite, or
(f) actmohte.
78-12-34.

1988

Repealed.

1981

ARTICLE 3
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
78-12-35. Effect of a b s e n c e from state.
Where a cause of action accrues against a person
when he is out of t h e state, the action m a y be commenced w i t h m the t e r m as limited by this chapter
after his r e t u r n to t h e state If after a cause of action
accrues he departs from t h e state, t h e time of his
absence is not part of t h e time limited for t h e commencement of the action
1987
78-12-36. Effect of disability.
If a person entitled to bring an action, other t h a n
for t h e recovery of real property, is a t t h e time the
cause of action accrued, either under t h e age of majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal
guardian, the time of the disability is not a p a r t of the
time limited for t h e commencement of t h e action
1987

78-12-37. Effect of d e a t h .
If a person entitled to bring an action dies before
t h e expiration of the time limited for the commencem e n t thereof, and t h e cause of action survives, an
action may be commenced by his representatives aft e r the expiration of t h a t time and within one year
from his death If a person against whom an action
may be brought dies before t h e expiration of t h e time
limited for t h e commencement thereof and t h e cause
of action survives, a n action may be commenced
against the representatives after t h e expiration of
t h a t time and within one year after t h e issue of lett e r s testamentary or of administration
1953

78-12-38. Effect of death of defendant outside
this state.
If a person against whom a cause of action exists
dies without the state, the time which elapses between his death and t h e expiration of one year after
the issuing, within this state, of letters t e s t a m e n t a r y
or letters of administration is not a p a r t of t h e time

in

78-12-47

limited for the commencement of an action therefor
against his executor or administrator
1953
78-12-39. Effect of war.
When a person is an alien subject or a citizen of a
country at war with the United States, t h e time of the
continuance of the war is not a p a r t of t h e period
limited for the commencement of the action
1963
78-12-40.

Effect of failure of a c t i o n n o t o n
merits.
If any action is commenced within due time and a
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if
the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of
action otherwise t h a n upon the merits, and t h e time
limited either b> law or contract for commencing t h e
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies
and the cause of action survives, his representatives,
may commence a new action within one year after t h e
reversal or failure
1953

78-12-41. Effect of injunction or prohibition.
When the commencement of an action is stayed by
injunction or a statutory prohibition the time of the
continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not
part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action
19S3
78-12-42. Disability must exist when right of action accrues.
No person can avail himself of a disability, unless it
existed when his right of action accrued
1953
78-12-43. All d i s a b i l i t i e s m u s t b e r e m o v e d .
When two or more disabilities coexist a t the time
the n g h t of action accrues, t h e limitation does not
attach until all are removed.
1953
78-12-44.

Effect of p a y m e n t , a c k n o w l e d g m e n t ,
or p r o m i s e to p a y .
In any case founded on contract, when any p a r t of
the principal or interest shall have been paid, or an
acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or
claim, or any promise to pay t h e same, shall h a v e
been made, an action m a y be brought within t h e period prescribed for t h e same after such payment, acknowledgment or promise, but such acknowledgment
or promise must be m writing, signed by t h e party to
be charged thereby When a right of action is barred
by the provisions of any s t a t u t e , it shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or ground of defense
1953

78-12-45. Action barred in another state barred
here.
When a cause of action has arisen in another state
or territory, or in a foreign country, and by the laws
thereof an action thereon cannot there be maintained
against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an
action thereon shall not be maintained against him
m this state, except in favor of one who has been a
citizen of this state and who has held the cause of
action from the time it accrued.
1953
78-12-46. "Action" includes special proceeding.
The word "action," as used in this chapter, is to be
construed, whenever it is necessary to do so, as including a special proceeding of a civil nature
1953
78-12-47. Separate trial of statute of limitations
issue in malpractice actions.
In any action against a physician and surgeon, dentist, osteopathic physician, chiropractor, physical
therapist, registered nurse, clinical laboratory
bioanalyst, clinical laboratory technologist, or a h-

78-27-21
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78-27-21. Effect of failure to file certificate —
Service of process upon nonresident.
Whenever any such nonresident doing business; as
provided in t h e preceding section [Section 78-27-20]
shall fail to file such certificate, or such manager,
superintendent or agent designated in such certificate cannot be found within t h e state of Utah, sen/ice
of process upon such nonresident in any action arising out of t h e conduct of his business may be had by
serving a n y person employed by or acting as agent for
such nonresident.
1953
78-27-22. J u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r n o n r e s i d e n t s — Purpose of provision.
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of redress
against nonresident persons, who, through certain
significant minimal contacts with this state, incur
obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection. This legislative action is deemed necessary because of technological progress which has substantially increased the flow of commerce between the
several states resulting in increased interaction between persons of this state and persons of other
states.
The provisions of this act, to .ensure maximum protection to citizens of this state, should be applied so as
to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to
the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
1969
78-27-23. J u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r n o n r e s i d e n t s — Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) The words "any person" mean any individual, firm, company, association, or corporation.
(2) The words "transaction of business within
this state" mean activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state
which affect persons or businesses within the
state of Utah.
1969
78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts
submitting person to jurisdiction.
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-102,
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who
in person or through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this
state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in
this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state
whether tortious or by breach of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any
real estate situated in this state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property,
or risk located within this state at the time of
contracting;
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in
the marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent departure from the
state; or the commission in this state of the act
giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not
a mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence
over which the defendent had no control; or
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suit under C h a p t e r 45a, Title 78, to determine
paternity for t h e purpose of establishing responsibility for child support.
1987

78-27-25. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Service of process.
Service of process on a n y party outside t h e s t a t e
may be made p u r s u a n t to the applicable provisions of
Rule 4 of the U t a h Rules of Civil Procedure.
Service of s u m m o n s and of a copy of t h e complaint,
if any, may also be made upon any person located
without this s t a t e by any individual over 21 years of
age, not a party to t h e action, with t h e same force and
effect as though t h e s u m m o n s had been personally
served within this s t a t e . No order of court is required.
An affidavit of t h e server shall be filed with t h e court
s t a t i n g the time, m a n n e r and place of service. The
court may consider t h e affidavit, or any other compet e n t proofs, in determining w h e t h e r proper service
has been made.
Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to
limit or affect t h e right to serve process in any other
m a n n e r provided by law.
1969

78-27-26. Jurisdiction over nonresidents —
Only claims arising from enumerated
acts may be asserted.
Only claims arising from acts enumerated herein
may be asserted against a defendant in an action in
which jurisdiction over him is based upion this act.
1969

78-27-27. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Default judgments.
No default shall be entered until the expiration of
at least thirty days after service. A default judgment
rendered on service may be set aside only on a showing which would be timely and sufficient to set aside
a default judgment rendered on personal service
within this state.
1969
78-27-28. Jurisdiction over nonresidents —
When may be exercised.
Subject to the applicable statute of limitations, jurisdiction established under this act shall be exercised regardless of when the claim arose.
1969
78-27-29 to 78-27-31.

Superseded.

1983

78-27-32. Release or settlement of personal injury claim — When voidable.
(1) Any release of liability or settlement agreement entered into within a period of fifteen days from
the date of an occurrence causing physical injury to
any person, or entered into prior to the initial discharge of this person from any hospital or sanitarium
in which the injured person is confined as a result of
the injuries sustained in the occurrence, is voidable
by the injured person, as provided in this act.
(2) Notice of cancellation of the release or settlement agreement, together with any payment or other
consideration received in connection with this release
or agreement shall be mailed or delivered to the party
to whom the release or settlement agreement was
given, by the later of the following dates:
(a) within fifteen days from the date of the occurrence causing the injuries which are subject of
the settlement agreement or liability release; or
(b) within fifteen days after t h e date of the injured person's discharge from the hospital or sanitarium in which this person h a s been confined
continuously since the date of the occurrence
causing the injury.
1973

(7) the commission of sexual intercourse
within this s t a t e which gives rise to a paternity
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Rule 1

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

PART I.
SCOPE OF RULES—ONE FORM OF
ACTION.
Rule 1. General provisions.
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts,
the circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state of
Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil
nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in
all special statutory proceedings, except as governed
by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted
by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81.
They shall be liberally construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on
January 1, 1950; and thereafter all laws in conflict
therewith shall be of no further force or effect. They
govern all proceedings in actions brought after they
take effect and also all further proceedings in actions
then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion
of the court their application in a particular action
pending when the rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure applies.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Rule 2. One form of action.
There shall be one form of action to be known as
"civil action."
PART n .
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; SERVICE
OF PROCESS, PLEADINGS,
MOTIONS AND ORDERS.
Rule 3. Commencement of action.
(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced
(1) by filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by the
service of a summons. If the action is commenced by
the service of a summons, the complaint, together
with the summons and proof of service thereof, must
be filed within ten days after such service and a copy
of the complaint shall be served upon or mailed to the
defendant if his address is known; if unknown, a copy
must be deposited with the clerk for him, or the action thus commenced shall be deemed dismissed and
the court shall have no further jurisdiction thereof;
provided, however, that the foregoing provision shall
not change the requirement of § 12-1-8, Utah Code
Annotated 1953.
(b) Filing copy of complaint. When the complaint is filed, a copy thereof shall be deposited with
the court for the benefit of the defendants not otherwise served with such copy at the time of the service
of the summons. Any defendant, not served with a
copy of the complaint, and for whom no copy thereof
is available with the court, may serve a written demand upon the plaintiff for a copy of such complaint,
and thereafter the time in which such defendant shall
be required to plead to the complaint shall commence
to run from the date a copy thereof is served upon
such defendant.
(c) Time of jurisdiction. The court shall have jurisdiction from the time of filing the complaint or the
service of the summons.
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Rule 4. Process.
(a) Issuance of summons. The summons may be
signed and issued by the plaintiff or his attorney. A
summons shall be deemed to have issued when placed
in the hands of a qualified person for the purpose of
service. Separate summonses may be issued and
served.
(b) Time of issuance and service. If an action is
commenced by the filing of a complaint, summons
must issue thereon within three months from the
date of such filing. The summons must be served
within one year after the filing of the complaint or
the action will be deemed dismissed, provided that in
any action brought against two or more defendants in
which personal service has been obtained upon one of
them within the year, the other or others may be
served or appear at any time before trial.
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall
contain the name of the court, the names or designations of the parties to the action, the county in which
it is brought, be directed to the defendant, state the
time within which the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall notify him
that in case of his failure to do so, judgment by default will be rendered against him. If the summons be
served without a copy of the complaint, or by publication, it shall briefly state the sum of money or other
relief demanded, and in case of publication of summons such summons as published shall contain a description of the subject matter or res involved in the
action. Where the summons is served without a complaint, it shall note therein that a copy of said complaint will be served upon or mailed to defendant
within ten days after such service or that if the address of defendant is unknown, the complaint will be
filed with the clerk of the court within ten days after
such service.
(d) By whom served. The summons, and a copy of
the complaint, if any, may be served:
(1) Within the state, by the sheriff of the
county where the service is made, or by his deputy, or by any other person over the age of 21
years, and not a party to the action; provided,
that this rule shall not abrogate the provisions of
chapter 28, Laws of Utah, 1945.
(2) In another state or United States territory
by the sheriff of the county where the service is
made, or by his deputy, or by a United States
marshal or his deputy.
(3) In a foreign country, either:
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of
the foreign country; or
(B) upon an individual, by delivery to him
personally, and upon a corporation or partnership or association, by delivery to an officer, a managing or general agent; or
(C) by any form of mail, requiring a
signed receipt, to be addressed and
dispatched by the clerk of the court to the
party to be served; or
(D) as directed by order of the court.
Service under (B) or (D) above may be made by
any person who is not a party and is not less than
21 years of age or who is designated by order of
the court.
(e) Personal service in state. Personal service
within the state shall be as follows:
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of 14
years or over, by delivering a copy thereof to him
personally, or by leaving such copy at his usual
place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion there residing; or by delivering a
M

Rule 1

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART L

SCOPE OF RULES—ONE FORM OF
ACTION.
Rule 1. General provisions.
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts,
the circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state of
Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil
nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in
all special statutory proceedings, except as governed
by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted
by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81.
They shall be liberally construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on
January 1, 1950; and thereafter all laws in conflict
therewith shall be of no further force or effect. They
govern all proceedings in actions brought after they
take effect and also all further proceedings in actions
then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion
of the court their application in a particular action
pending when the rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure applies.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Rule 2. One form of action.
There shall be one form of action to be known as
"civil action."
PART II.
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; SERVICE
OF PROCESS, PLEADINGS,
MOTIONS AND ORDERS.
Rule 3. Commencement of action.
(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced
(1) by filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by
service of a summons together with a copy of the complaint in accordance with Rule 4. If the action is commenced by the service of a summons and a copy of the
complaint, then the complaint, the summons and
proof of service, must be filed within ten days of such
service. If, in a case commenced under paragraph
(a)(2) of this rule, the complaint, summons and proof
of service are not filed within ten days of service, the
action commenced shall be deemed dismissed and the
court shall have no further jurisdiction thereof; provided, however, that the foregoing provision shall not
change the requirement of Utah Code Ann. Section
12-1-8 (1986).
(b) Time of jurisdiction. The court shall have jurisdiction from the time of filing of the complaint or
service of the summons and a copy of the complaint.
(Amended effective April 1, 1990.)
Rule 4. Process.
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be
signed and issued by the plaintiff or the plaintiffs
attorney. Separate summonses may be signed and
served.
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons together with a copy of
the complaint shall be served no later than 120 days
after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of time for good cause shown. If
the summons and complaint are not timely served,
the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on

458

application of any party or upon the court's own initiative. In any action brought against two or more
defendants on which service has been obtained upon
one of them within the 120 days or such longer period
as may be allowed by the court, the other or others
may be served or appear at any time prior to trial.
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall
contain the name of the court, the address of the
court, the names of the parties to the action, and the
county in which it is brought. It shall be directed to
the defendant, state the name, address and telephone
number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number. It
shall state the time within which the defendant is
required to answer the complaint in writing, and
shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do
so, judgment by default will be rendered against the
defendant. It shall state either that the complaint is
on file with the court or that the complaint will be
filed with the court within ten days of service. If service is made by publication, the summons shall
briefly state the subject matter and the sum of money
or other relief demanded, and that the complaint is on
file.
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint
may be served in this state or any other state or territory of the United States, by the sheriff or constable,
or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or older at the time of service, and
not a party to the action or a party's attorney.
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be
made as follows:
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered
by subparagraphs (2), (3) or (4) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint
to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy
at the individual's dwelling house or usual place
of abode with some person of suitable age and
discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy
of the summons and/or the complaint to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process;
(2) Upon an infant (being a person under 14
years) by delivering a copy to the infant and also
to the infant's father, mother or guardian or, if
none can be found within the state, then to any
person having the care and control of the infant,
or with whom the infant resides, or in whose service the infant is employed;
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to
be of unsound mind or incapable of conducting
his own affairs, by delivering a copy to the person
and to the person's legal representative if one has
been appointed and in the absence of such representative, to the individual, if any, who has care,
custody or control of the person;
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated by the state or any of its
political subdivisions, by delivering a copy to the
person who has the care, custody, or control of
the individual to be served, or to that person's
designee or to the guardian or conservator of the
individual to be served if one has been appointed,
who shall, in any case, promptly deliver the process to the individual served;
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise
provided for, up>on a partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof
to an officer, a managing.or general agent, or
other agent authorized by appointment or by law
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
EVELYN MUIR, LINDA MUIR,
DEANNA PFEIFFER, SANDRA
JENKINS, MARK MUIR, MARLO
JENKINS and DOUGLAS BAILEY,

AFFIDAVIT OF
WILLIAM P. SCHWARTZ

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 5719
W. H. BURT EXPLOSIVES, INC.,
a New Mexico corporation and
APACHE POWDER COMPANY,
a New Jersey corporation,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
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William P. Schwartz, being first duly sworn, hereby testifies as follows:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and

am a shareholder in the law firm of Hansen & Anderson, former counsel for the
plaintiffs in this action.

I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth

herein.
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2.

In late July of 1988, Ross Anderson, a shareholder in Hansen &

Anderson, was contacted by Linda Muir, one of the plaintiffs in the above action,
in connection with an explosion which occurred on September 5, 1986 in a blasting
and prospecting operation located in Duchesne County known as the "Golden
Phoenix Claims.11 Mr. Wallace A. Muir, the father of Linda Muir, was killed in the
explosion; Douglas Bailey and Mario Jenkins were injured in the explosion.
3#

The circumstances surrounding the explosion strongly indicated

that a portion of the fuse used at the Golden Phoenix Claims on September 5, 1986
burned at a much faster rate than other portions of the fuse, resulting in an
unexpected explosion. Because the explosion occurred on September 5, 1986, Mr.
Anderson and I were immediately concerned about the running of the statute of
limitation in regard to claims against Apache Powder Company ("Apache") and W.
H. Burt Explosives, Inc. ("Burt"), the respective entities which manufactured and
sold the blasting fuse that was used at the Golden Phoenix Claims at the time of
the explosion. Because of the two-year statute of limitation in Utah relating to
wrongful death actions (see Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28), Mr. Anderson and I
concluded that a complaint had to be filed on behalf of the plaintiffs no later than
September 5, 1988.
4.

On September 1, 1988, Hansen & Anderson commenced this action

by filing the Complaint on behalf of the plaintiffs in this Court against Apache
and Burt.
5.

In October of 1988, we informed the plaintiffs that we would not

represent them further in the case and that they should locate successor counsel.

2

We informed the plaintiffs that, under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
summonses had to be issued within three-months of the filing of the Complaint
and that the summonses and Complaint had to be served within one-year of the
filing of the Complaint.
6.

In order to give the plaintiffs as much time as possible to find

successor counsel, Mr. Anderson and I determined to cause the summonses to be
issued to Apache and Burt within three-months of the filing of the Complaint.
Therefore, on October 19, 1988, I prepared and executed summonses for Burt and
Apache. After executing the summonses, I placed them in the hands of Steven F.
Jackson, an employee of Hansen & Anderson, for the purpose of service of process
upon Burt and Apache. At the time I delivered the summonses to Mr. Jackson, I
told him that I wanted him to serve the summonses and the Complaint, but I asked
him to hold off on service for a time because our firm was withdrawing from the
case and the plaintiffs were attempting to locate new counsel who might want to
coordinate service.
7.

Plaintiffs were not able to locate new counsel as soon as they had

hoped. However, in June of 1989, Mr. Robert H. Copier notified Mr. Anderson
that Mr. Copier would be representing certain of the plaintiffs in this action.
Therefore, our firm filed a Notice of Withdrawal and Mr. Copier filed a Notice of
Appearance on behalf of certain of the plaintiffs.
8»

In July of 1989, Mr. Copier instructed Mr. Jackson to proceed with

service of the summonses and the Complaint in the manner set forth in the
Affidavit of Steve Jackson, dated July 3, 1989.

3

9.

My entire purpose in preparing the summonses and delivering them

to Mr. Jackson in this matter was to comply with Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. But for Rule 4(a), I would not have prepared and delivered the
summonses to Mr. Jackson. I have utilized Mr. Jackson on several occasions to
serve process on behalf of clients of the firm.
DATED: November OX

, 1989.

William P. Schwartz
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this^T^day o f ^ ^ g ^ 9 8 9 .
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